Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 71

Issue 4

Article 6

Fall 9-1-2014

The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete
Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change
Marc Edelman
Baruch College, City University of New York

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander
Change, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2319 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol71/iss4/6
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The District Court Decision in
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association: A Small Step
Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and
a Gateway for Far Grander Change
Marc Edelman
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ...................................................................2320
II. A Trial More Than Five Years in the Making:
The Procedural History in O’Bannon v. NCAA .............2322
A. Pleadings and Early Decisions ................................2322
B. Summary Judgment Motions ..................................2325
III. The District Court’s Ruling at Trial ..............................2330
A. Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law ...............2330
1. Relevant Markets and Anticompetitive
Effects of NCAA Rules .......................................2331
2. Alleged Procompetitive Benefits of the
NCAA Rules .......................................................2332
3. Allegedly Less Restrictive Alternatives ............2335
B. Permanent Injunction .............................................2337

 Professor Marc Edelman (Marc@MarcEdelman.com) is an Associate
Professor of Law at the Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City
University of New York. He is also a summer adjunct professor at Fordham
University School of Law and a columnist for Forbes Sports Money. Professor
Edelman earned his B.S. in economics from the Wharton School (University of
Pennsylvania) and both his J.D. and M.A. from the University of Michigan. He
has published more than twenty-five law review articles on the intersection of
sports and the law, and he has lectured nationally on sports law topics.
Professor Edelman wishes to thank the participants at the Marquette
University Sports Law Works in Progress Conference for their comments on an
earlier draft of this Article. He also wishes to thank his wife, Rachel Leeds
Edelman, for reviewing an earlier draft of this Article.

2319

2320

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319 (2014)

IV. Why the District Court Was Correct to Find the
NCAA’s Restraints on Revenue Sharing to Violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act ........................................2338
V. Why the District Court’s Permanent Injunction
in O’Bannon Was Insufficient, and Does Not
Fully Ameliorate the NCAA’s Restraints ......................2343
VI. Implications of the O’Bannon Decision and Logical
Next Steps ......................................................................2347
A. Grounds for an NCAA Appeal .................................2348
B. Grounds for a Plaintiffs’ Appeal ..............................2351
C. Subject Matter for Subsequent Lawsuits Against
the NCAA .................................................................2352
D. Impact of the O’Bannon Ruling on CollegeAthlete Unionizing and Title IX Compliance..........2355
E. Potential NCAA Advocacy Before Congress
for a Statutory Antitrust Exemption ......................2359
VII. Conclusion ......................................................................2363
I. Introduction
On August 8, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California held in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association1 that the NCAA rules that prevent men’s
college basketball and football players from controlling the
commercial rights to their names and likenesses “unreasonably
restrain trade in the market for certain educational and athletic
opportunities offered by NCAA Division I schools.”2 The court
then issued an injunction preventing the NCAA from restraining
its members from compensating their men’s basketball and
football players up to $5,000 per year for the use of their
likenesses.3 The court further enjoined the NCAA from
prohibiting monetary awards to college athletes in the amounts
1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-093329-CW, 2014 WL 3899815 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014).
2. Id. at *2.
3. See Permanent Injunction at 1, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (enjoining the NCAA from prohibiting player
compensation).
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up to “the full cost of attending the respective NCAA member
school.”4
The O’Bannon decision is an important step forward for both
college-athletes’ rights and sports law jurisprudence because it
recognizes that NCAA rules limiting college-athlete pay may
violate section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.5 Nevertheless, the
ruling’s impact is tempered by the iconoclastic nature of the
court’s injunction, which limits the immediate potential for
college-athlete compensation beyond a nominal amount.6 At the
same time, the ruling seems to ignore the broader implications of
NCAA restraints on third-party markets for licensing celebrities’
likenesses for endorsements—restraints that federal courts
eventually must overturn.7
This Article explains why the district court decision in
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association was correct
to hold that the NCAA unreasonably restrained trade by
preventing athletes from sharing revenues derived from the use
of their names and likenesses, but too narrow in its injunction
that only mandated the NCAA to allow compensation through a
deferred trust in amounts up to $5,000 per year. Part II of this
article provides the procedural history of O’Bannon v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association—a case that many believed would
fundamentally change the nature of college-athletes’ rights in
America.8 Part III explains the findings of fact and conclusions of
law in the O’Bannon bench trial, and discusses the court’s
4. Id. at 2; see also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 1,
at 20 (explaining that the “gap between the full grant-in-aid,” which represents
the full cost of attending a respective school “and the cost of attendance varies
from school to school but is typically a few thousand dollars”).
5. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 1, at 1–2
(finding that NCAA rules barring student-athletes from receiving revenue
earned from the use of their “names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live
game telecasts, and other footage . . . unreasonably restrain trade in the market
for certain educational and athletic opportunities offered by NCAA Division I
schools”); see also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared
to be illegal.”).
6. See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text (discussing the
permanent injunction in greater detail).
7. See infra notes 109–28 and accompanying text (discussing why the
permanent injunction does not fully ameliorate NCAA restraints).
8. Infra Part II.
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permanent injunction issued against the NCAA.9 Part IV
explains why the district court in O’Bannon was legally correct to
find the NCAA’s restraints on sharing revenues with college
athletes violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.10 Part V explains
why the permanent injunction issued by the court in O’Bannon
does not fully ameliorate the NCAA’s restraints.11 Finally, Part
VI discusses the logical next steps that could follow the district
court’s decision in O’Bannon, including the possibility of an
appeal by both parties, follow-up lawsuits seeking to further
dismantle the NCAA’s amateurism rules, player unionization
efforts, Title IX compliance issues, and a petition by the NCAA to
Congress for a broad-based antitrust exemption to fully preserve
its longstanding restraints on college-athlete pay.12
II. A Trial More Than Five Years in the Making: The Procedural
History in O’Bannon v. NCAA
A. Pleadings and Early Decisions
The recent bench trial in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association represents the culmination of more than five
years of litigation by elite men’s basketball and football players
against the NCAA.13 This litigation began on June 21, 2009 when
twelve former NCAA football and men’s basketball players, led by
9. Infra Part III.
10. Infra Part IV.
11. Infra Part V.
12. Infra Part VI.
13. See infra notes 14–48 and accompanying text (summarizing the
procedural history). For further discussion of the case history in O’Bannon v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association, see Marc Edelman, The Future of
Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA
Student-Athlete Name & Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of
College Sports, 92 OR. L. REV. 1019, 1033–36 (2014) (discussing the O’Bannon
case history more thoroughly); Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust Exemption for
the NCAA: Sound Policy or Letting the Fox Loose in the Henhouse?, 41 PEPP. L.
REV. 229, 235 (2014) (providing a concise procedural history of the O’Bannon
case); Michael McCann, Ed O’Bannon v. NCAA Class Certification Hearing
Primer, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://www.si.com/college-football/2013/06/19/
ncaa-ed-obannon-hearing-primer (last updated May 28, 2014) (last visited Nov.
18, 2014) (providing an overview of the case’s procedural history in more
colloquial language) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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former UCLA basketball standout Ed O’Bannon, filed an
antitrust complaint against the college sports trade association in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.14
The complaint alleged, in pertinent part, that NCAA members
“conspired to fix the price of former student athletes’ images at
zero and . . . boycott former student athletes in the collegiate
licensing market.”15 The complaint further alleged that “these
restraints occurred within a product market for live broadcasts,
various kinds of non-live game video footage, and college sports
videogames.”16
Since the filing of this antitrust complaint, the plaintiffs’ case
has morphed “like Heraclitus’s river: always changing, yet always
the same.”17 On January 15, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California consolidated the substance of the
complaint in O’Bannon with that of another lawsuit before the
same court, Keller v. Electronic Arts.18 “The Keller litigation had
asserted claims against the NCAA, the College Licensing
Company (the NCAA’s independent licensing arm), and the
videogame developer Electronic Arts, all related to an alleged
conspiracy to violate student-athletes’ publicity rights in college
sports videogames.”19 The central link between the two cases was
that, in Keller, one of Electronic Arts’s affirmative defenses was
that “the NCAA granted it the rights to use student-athlete
likenesses.”20 “Meanwhile, in the early stages of O’Bannon, the
NCAA denied having granted any such rights to third parties.”21
14. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1033; see also Complaint at 2–8, O’Bannon
v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW (N.D. Cal. Jul. 21, 2009) (stating plaintiffs’
antitrust claims); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig., No. C-09-1967-CW, 2011 WL 1642256, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011)
(discussing the procedural history).
15. Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motions to Dismiss at 9, O’Bannon v.
NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW, 2010 WL 445190, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010); see
also In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 2011 WL
1642256, at *2 (stating the antitrust violations alleged in the complaint).
16. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1033 (citing Complaint, supra note 14, at
62–67).
17. Id. at 1034 (quoting Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football
Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1994)).
18. Id. (footnote omitted).
19. Id. (footnote omitted).
20. Id. (footnote omitted).
21. Id. (citing Jon Solomon, NCAA Knew EA Sports Videogames Used Real
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After the court consolidated O’Bannon and Keller into a
single litigation known as the NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litigation, “the plaintiffs then filed an
amended complaint and moved for class certification—a motion”
that was vehemently opposed by the NCAA.22 “Thereafter, the
court notified the plaintiffs that they would need to add at least
one current student-athlete to their complaint” to avoid
dismissal—a result that “led the plaintiffs to file a third amended
complaint adding six current student-athletes as named
plaintiffs.”23
“[B]efore the court could review this third amended
complaint, the plaintiffs [from the Keller case] entered into
settlement negotiations with both Electronic Arts and the College
Licensing Company, which led to the filing of a stipulation of
settlement.”24 This settlement “left the court to review the merits

Players, E-mails from Ed O’Bannon Lawsuit Show, AL.COM, http://www.al.com/
sports/index.ssf/2012/11/ncaa_knew_ea_sports_video_game.html (last updated
Nov. 12, 2012) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (quoting NCAA spokesperson Erik
Christianson as stating that “the NCAA never marketed student-athlete
likeness[es]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. Id. at 1034–35 (footnote omitted); see also Tom Fornelli, Court Asks
O’Bannon’s Lawyers to Add Current Players to Lawsuit, CBSSPORTS.COM,
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-collegefootball/22498428/
obannons-lawyers-asked-to-add-current-players-to-lawsuit (last updated June
21, 2013) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (stating that “[t]he NCAA maintains the
lawsuit should not be a class-action lawsuit because the claims of thousands of
college athletes are different and should not be treated the same”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1035 (footnote omitted); see also Steve
Berkowitz, Judge Will Allow Current Player to Join O’Bannon Suit, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/07/05/ed-obannon-ncaalikeness-lawsuit/2492981 (last updated July 5, 2013) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
(discussing the court ruling requiring the plaintiffs to add at least one current
college athlete as a named plaintiff) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
24. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1035 (footnote omitted); see also Order
Denying Motions to Dismiss at 1, 7, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013); cf.
Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, William H. Lyons & Kevin N. Rask, What’s in a Name?
The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate Model, and the Treatment of StudentAthletes, 92 OR. L. REV. 879, 911 (2014) (noting that the settlement was no
surprise because Electronic Arts’s claim that its videogames were entitled to
First Amendment protection had already been denied by two different federal
circuit courts).
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of the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims only vis-à-vis the NCAA.”25 “[O]n
November 8, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California [then] certified a class to pursue injunctive
relief against the NCAA” based upon the antitrust claims that
were originally pled in the O’Bannon complaint.26 The certified
class included:
All current and former student-athletes residing in the United
States who compete on, or competed on, an NCAA Division
I . . . college or university men’s basketball team or on an
NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision . . . men’s football team and
whose images, likenesses, and/or names may be, or have been,
included in game footage or in videogames licensed or sold by
[the NCAA], their co-conspirators, or their licensees after the
conclusion of the athlete’s participation in intercollegiate
athletics.27

“The court did not certify a damages subclass.” 28
B. Summary Judgment Motions
Plaintiffs and the NCAA thereafter filed cross-motions for
summary judgment.29 Plaintiffs urged the court to find the
25. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1035 (citing Order Denying Motions to
Dismiss, supra note 24, at 8–24).
26. Id. at 1035–36 (citing Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Motion for Class Certification at 5–16, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327, at *3–7 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 8, 2013)).
27. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Class
Certification at 23, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013).
28. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1036 (footnote omitted); see also Order
Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting Motion to Amend
Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration
at 4, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C
09-1967 CW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014) (noting that “[t]he Court granted
Plaintiffs’ request to certify the injunctive relief class but denied their request to
certify a damages subclass, citing various barriers to class manageability”).
29. See Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 4 (“On November 15, 2013, one week after
the class certification order issued, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for
summary judgment. The NCAA cross-moved for summary judgment one month
later.”).
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NCAA’s restraints on college-athlete compensation illegal
because they alleged that the procompetitive justifications for the
restraints lacked any bona fide economic merit.30 Meanwhile, the
NCAA urged the court, among other things, to find the
procompetitive effects of their restraints on college-athlete pay
sufficient to dismiss the case in its entirety.31 For the most part,
the court dismissed both parties’ summary judgment motions,
albeit the court did rule in favor of the plaintiffs with respect to
one of the NCAA’s alleged procompetitive justifications.32
The court opined that in order to prevail on a restraint of
trade claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs
needed to prove three elements: “(1) that there was a contract,
combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably
restrained trade under . . . rule of reason analysis; and (3) that
the restraint affected interstate commerce.”33 With the court
having already concluded in earlier proceedings that the first and
third elements of such a claim were met, the cross-motions for
summary judgment focused exclusively on the second element:
the restraint’s competitive effects.34
30. See id. at 29–41 (disputing the NCAA’s purported procompetitive
justifications).
31. See id. (analyzing the NCAA’s justifications, including “(1) the
preservation of amateurism in college sports; (2) promoting competitive balance
among Division I teams; (3) the integration of education and athletics;
(4) increased support for women’s sports and less prominent men’s sports; and
(5) greater output of Division I football and basketball”).
32. See id. at 47 (“Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment that the
NCAA’s fourth asserted justification for the challenged restraint—increased
support for women’s sports and less prominent men’s sports—is not legitimately
procompetitive.”).
33. Id. at 7 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
id. at 8–9 (explaining why the rule of reason was the most appropriate standard
under the second prong of the court’s test). See generally Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”). It is worth further noting that
while these three requirements are recognized by all circuits, they are often
stated somewhat differently, with the first and third being grouped together
into what are often called “threshold requirements.” See, e.g., Edelman, supra
note 13, at 1037 (referencing the “threshold requirements” to a section 1
Sherman Act claim); Marc Edelman, The NCAA’s “Death Penalty Sanction”—
Reasonable Self-Governance or an Illegal Group Boycott in Disguise?, 18 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 385, 394 (2014) (same).
34. See Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for
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The court further explained that, with respect to the
competitive effects element of an antitrust violation, longstanding
Ninth Circuit precedent has held that “[a] restraint violates the
rule of reason if the restraint’s harm to competition outweighs its
procompetitive effects” based on “a burden-shifting framework.”35
Under this burden-shifting framework, the court explained that
the “plaintiff[s] bear[] the initial burden of showing that the
restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a
relevant market.”36 If the plaintiffs meet this burden, the
defendants then must produce evidence of the restraint’s
procompetitive benefits.37 Meanwhile, if the defendants produce
sufficient evidence of procompetitive effects, the plaintiffs finally
must “show that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a
substantially less restrictive manner.”38
Applying this three-step approach, the court in O’Bannon
concluded that the plaintiffs met their initial burden of showing
that the NCAA’s restraints on athlete pay produced a significant
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 9–14 (analyzing the parties’ arguments
regarding the competitive effects of the NCAA’s restraints on student-athletes’
pay). See generally Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 1, at 48
(“The NCAA does not dispute that [its challenged] rules were enacted and are
enforced pursuant to an agreement among its Division I member schools and
conferences. Nor does it dispute that these rules affect interstate commerce.
Accordingly, the only remaining question here is whether the challenged rules
restrain trade unreasonably.”).
35. Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 7 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252
F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This
burden-shifting framework has been adopted by most, but not all courts; the
practical realities of how courts apply the framework is discussed in detail by
esteemed antitrust-law professor Michael Carrier in his article The Rule of
Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century. See Michael A. Carrier, The
Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 827, 829–36 (2009) (exploring instances of courts applying the
burden-shifting framework).
36. Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 7 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252
F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
37. See id. (citing Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir.
2001)) (stating the second part of the burden-shifting framework).
38. Id. at 7–8 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th
Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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anticompetitive effect within the two relevant markets: “the
‘college education’ market and the ‘group licensing’ market”39—a
burden that is met by less than 3% of all antitrust plaintiffs. 40
The court then reviewed whether the NCAA met its burden of
producing evidence related to procompetitive benefits of its
restraints on athlete pay from the use of their names, images,
and likenesses.41 In this vein, the court analyzed five purported
procompetitive effects alleged by the NCAA: (1) preserving
amateurism in college sports; (2) promoting competitive balance
among Division I teams; (3) the increased output benefits in
college sports; (4) increased integration of education and
39. See id. at 9–11 (discussing the court’s reasoning for determining that
the plaintiffs’ had offered “sufficiently plausible evidence of anticompetitive
effects” in both markets).
40. See Carrier, supra note 35, at 828 (noting that “[c]ourts dispose of 97%
of cases at the first stage” of burden-shifting—the showing of an anticompetitive
effect). In finding that plaintiffs had met their initial burden with respect to the
group licensing market, the court concluded that there was indeed a real
possibility that such a market existed because, absent the NCAA’s restraints,
the plaintiffs had cognizable rights of publicity, and these rights were not
preempted by the First Amendment. See Order Resolving Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment, Granting Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying
Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 15–29
(analyzing the existence and scope of a group-licensing market). For further
information about college athletes’ publicity rights, see Marc Edelman, Closing
the “Free Speech” Loophole: The Case for Protecting College Athletes’ Publicity
Rights in Commercial Video Games, 65 FLA. L. REV. 553, 567–84 (2013)
(discussing in detail college athletes’ publicity rights and their balance against
First Amendment considerations). Even with respect to the use of college
athletes’ likenesses in live television broadcasts, the court concluded that “the
First Amendment does not guarantee . . . an unfettered right to broadcast entire
sporting events without regard for the participating athletes’ rights of
publicity.” Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 16 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad.
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563–64, 574–76 (1977)). See generally id. at 20
There is no principled reason why the First Amendment would allow
the NCAA to restrict press access to college football and basketball
games (via exclusive licensing agreements) but, at the same time,
prohibit student-athletes from doing the same (via right-of-publicity
actions) . . . . As far as the First Amendment is concerned, these
rights stand on equal footing.
41. See Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 29–41 (analyzing the NCAA’s procompetitive
justifications).
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athletics; and (5) increased viability of maintaining less popular
men’s sports and women’s sports.42
The court held that the NCAA’s purported procompetitive
justification of maintaining less popular men’s sports and
women’s sports failed as a matter of law, and awarded summary
judgment to the plaintiffs on that argument.43 However, the court
denied both parties’ summary judgment motions with respect to
all other affirmative defenses, recognizing that each defense
entailed unresolved issues of fact.44 Most notably, the court
opined that the NCAA could prevail on its amateurism defense if
it could factually prove that maintaining amateurism increased
overall consumer demand for college sports.45 Meanwhile, the
NCAA could prevail on its argument that no-pay rules promote
the integration of education and athletics if it could demonstrate
that this integration would actually enhance the quality of
student athletes’ educational experience.46

42. See id. at 29 (describing the five procompetitive effects).
43. See id. at 38–40 (finding that the NCAA’s purported defense “is not a
legitimate procompetitive justification” because competition cannot be foreclosed
with respect to a particular sector of the economy simply to promote competition
within a different economic sector (citing United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405
U.S. 596, 610 (1972))). In addition, as the court explained in its discussion of the
integration of education and athletics defense, a restraint of trade may not be
justified on the basis of social or public policy goals. See id. at 36 (“[A]ntitrust
defendants cannot rely on these types of social welfare benefits to justify
anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act.” (citing FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990))).
44. See id. at 29–41 (noting conflicting evidence regarding the purported
procompetitive benefits of preserving amateurism, promoting competitive
balance among teams, fostering integration of education and athletics, and
increasing output benefits in college sports).
45. See id. (noting that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the
challenged rules serve the procompetitive purpose of promoting amateurism).
46. See id. at 36–38 (indicating that the NCAA would need to present
evidence at trial to show that “(1) the ban on student-athlete compensation
actually contributes to the integration of education and athletics and (2) the
integration of education and athletics enhances competition in the ‘college
education’ or ‘group licensing’ market”). Relying on Supreme Court decisions
such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, which have
held that social welfare benefits may not justify otherwise anticompetitive
conduct, the court explained that the NCAA’s integration of education with
athletics argument could prevail only if the integration actually promoted
competition within the relevant market. Id. at 36.
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Recognizing these outstanding issues of fact, the court then
ordered a pretrial conference and jury trial on the outstanding
issues.47 The plaintiffs thereafter waived their right to trial by
jury, and instead opted for a bench trial before Judge Wilken.48
III. The District Court’s Ruling at Trial
The bench trial in O’Bannon v. NCAA spanned three weeks—
beginning on Monday, June 9, 2014, and culminating on Friday,
June 27, 2014.49 On August 8th, Judge Wilken issued her ruling
in the form of a ninety-nine page “findings of fact and conclusions
of law.” 50 At the same time, the court entered a judgment in favor
of the class action plaintiffs, and ordered a permanent injunction
against the NCAA.51
A. Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law
The court’s decision, in summary, found that “the challenged
NCAA rules unreasonably restrained trade in the market for
certain educational and athletic opportunities offered by NCAA
Division I schools.”52 The decision further held that the
procompetitive justifications that the NCAA offered did not

47. See id. at 48 (describing the court’s order).
48. See Sara Ganim, As Testimony Starts in Former College Star’s Suit,
NCAA Settles Another Suit, CNN (June 9, 2014), http://www.cnn.
com/2014/06/09/us/ed-obannon-ncaa-lawsuit (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (noting
that “the plaintiffs gave up their request for monetary damages in exchange for
a bench trial, meaning there will be no jury, and the judge will make the
decision”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
49. O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW, 2014 WL 3899815, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 8, 2014).
50. Id. at *1–99.
51. Permanent Injunction at 1–2, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C-09-3329-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014); see
Judgment at *1, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014)
(stating that a judgment in the case “is hereby entered in favor of the Class
Plaintiff, and the Plaintiffs recover from Defendant National Collegiate Athletic
Association their costs of action”).
52. O’Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *2.
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justify the NCAA’s restraints, and these restraints could have
been achieved through less restrictive means. 53
1. Relevant Markets and Anticompetitive Effects of NCAA Rules
The court first concluded that plaintiffs presented
sufficient evidence to show that the NCAA’s restraints on
competition in the college education market yielded bona fide
anticompetitive effects. 54 With respect to the alleged relevant
markets and anticompetitive effects in those markets, the
court found that the evidence presented established that NCAA
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision schools (“FBS football
schools”) and the Division I men’s basketball schools “compete
to recruit the best high school football and basketball
players.”55 In addition, the court found that “FBS football and
Division I basketball schools are the only suppliers of the
unique bundles of goods and services described above.” 56
Based upon these findings, the court then concluded that
“absent the challenged NCAA rules, teams of FBS football and
Division I basketball players would be able to compete for the
services of college athletes by offering them a share of the
revenues derived from the use of their names, images, or
likenesses in various forms.” 57 However, because of the NCAA’s
current rules, athletes at FBS football schools and Division I
men’s basketball schools have been precluded from selling

53. See id. (describing the limits of the NCAA restraints).
54. See id. at *78 (“Because Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to
show that the NCAA’s rules impose a restraint on competition in the college
education market, the Court must determine whether that restraint is
justified.”).
55. Id. at *7–8; see also id. at *12 (concluding that “there are no
professional football or basketball leagues capable of supplying a substitute for
the bundle of goods and services that FBS football and Division I basketball
schools provide”).
56. Id. at *8; see also id. at *11–12 (finding that NFL and NBA teams are
not an alternative market to college sports because they do not permit players to
enter their league directly after high school and, furthermore, that minor league
sports teams are not alternative markets because “recruits do not typically
pursue opportunities in those leagues”).
57. Id. at *16, *19.
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their services in the United States, if not the world.58 In a legal
sense, this finding represented an anticompetitive restraint of
trade within this college education market. 59
2. Alleged Procompetitive Benefits of the NCAA Rules
Once the court found the plaintiffs to have met their
burden of proving anticompetitive effects within a relevant
antitrust market, the district court next turned to whether the
NCAA was able to prove a procompetitive benefit within the
same market.60 Upon review of the evidence, the court fully
rejected two of the defendants’ procompetitive justifications—
one based on competitive balance, and the other based on a
purported increase in the number of schools competing in FBS
football and Division I men’s basketball. 61 Nevertheless, two
58. See id. at *22 (explaining that in agreements with schools, the “recruit
provides his athletic performance and the use of his name, image, and likeness.
However, the schools agree to value the latter at zero by agreeing not to compete
with each other to credit any other value to the recruit in the exchange”).
59. See id. at *56 (“This price fixing agreement constitutes a restraint of
trade.”). As a matter of law, this anticompetitive restraint did not require the
plaintiffs to make a direct showing of consumer harm because “[t]he Supreme
Court has indicated that monopsonistic practices that harm suppliers may
violate antitrust law even if they do not directly harm consumers.” Id. at *63
(citing Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)).
60. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at *78, O’Bannon v.
NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW, 2014 WL 3899815 (citing Paladin Associates, Inc. v.
Montana Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that to
determine whether anticompetitive restraints are justified, the Court “must
consider whether the ‘anticompetitive aspects of the challenged practice
outweigh its procompetitive effects’”).
61. With respect to the NCAA’s claims that its restraints promoted
competitive balance, the court found such evidence fully rebutted by the
plaintiffs’ lawyers, concluding that “the NCAA has not presented sufficient
evidence to show that its restrictions on compensation actually have any effect
on competitive balance, let alone produce an optimal level of competitive
balance.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at *83, O’Bannon v. NCAA,
No. C-09-3329-CW, 2014 WL 3899815. See generally id. at *34–37 (discussing
the entirety of the court’s finding of facts with respect to the NCAA’s
competitive balance argument). The court recognized that “[e]ven if the NCAA
had presented some evidence of a causal connection between its challenged rules
and its current level of competitive balance, [the NCAA] ha[d] not shown that
the current level of competitive balance [was] necessary to maintain its current
level of consumer demand.” Id. at *36. Moreover, the trend of premier college
sports programs using their additional resources to invest more heavily in
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other of the NCAA’s affirmative defenses fared somewhat
better.62
With regard to the NCAA’s first affirmative defense—that its
restraints on college-athlete pay were procompetitive because
they “promote[d] consumer demand for its product by preserving
its tradition of amateurism in college sports”—the court held that
“the NCAA’s restrictions on student-athlete compensation play a
limited role in driving FBS football and Division I basketballrelated products.”63 Thus, while “these restraints might justify a
restriction on large payments to student-athletes while in school,
they do not justify the rigid prohibition on compensating studentathletes—in the present or the future—with any share of
licensing revenue generated from the use of their names, images
and likenesses.”64 Of particular note, the court found that the
“recruiting efforts, athletic facilities, dorms, coaching, and other amenities
designed to attract the top student-athletes . . . negated whatever equalizing
effect the NCAA’s restraints on student-athlete compensation might have once
had on competitive balance.” Id. at *85. As for the NCAA’s claims that its
restraints enabled it to increase the number of schools and student-athletes that
participate in FBS football and Division I basketball, the court found that “the
restrictions on student-athlete compensation do nothing to increase this output.”
Id. at *40. To the contrary, the court found the evidence to show that “because
participation in FBS football and Division I basketball typically raises a school’s
profile and leads to increased athletic-based revenue, the number of schools
participating in FBS football and Division I basketball has increased steadily
throughout time, and likely will continue to rise.” Id. at *40. Moreover, “the
NCAA’s assertion that schools will leave FBS and Division I for financial
reasons if the challenged restraints were removed was not credible.” Id. at *41–
42.
62. See id. at *37–43 (recognizing, in part, the benefits of integrating
student-athletes into college communities and increasing the number of games
played).
63. Id. at *24, *82.
64. Id. at *82–83. As a matter of law, the court rejected the NCAA’s
argument that the Supreme Court holding in Board of Regents v. NCAA stood
for the sweeping proposition that student-athletes must be barred during their
college years and forever thereafter from receiving any money for NCAA
members’ use of their names, likeness, and identities, holding to the contrary
that certain incidental language in Board of Regents “does not establish that the
NCAA’s current restraints on compensation are procompetitive and without less
restrictive alternatives.” Id. at *79, *80. Upon review of the factual evidence
related to the purported link between the NCAA’s no-pay rules and preserving
fan interest via amateurism, the court found that “the historical evidence
presented demonstrates that the association’s amateurism rules have not been
nearly as consistent as the NCAA has proclaimed.” Id. at *24, *27 (indicating
further that in the early days of college sports the NCAA’s amateurism rules did
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NCAA failed to present any evidence whatsoever that payment to
college athletes of less than $20,000 per year, or payment to
college athletes via a trust, would harm consumer demand to
view college sports.65
Meanwhile, as for the NCAA’s proposed justification that its
restraints on athlete pay help to “promote the integration of
academics and athletics,” the court found the evidence presented
by the NCAA to somewhat validate this argument.66 Recognizing
a legal principle that improving product quality may be a
legitimate procompetitive justification, the court acknowledged
that the pay restraints could be procompetitive if they helped to
reduce the great disparity in wealth among college students, and
that this result helped “to integrate student-athletes into the
academic communities of their schools.”67 Nevertheless, the court
still concluded that the only way in which the challenged rules
might facilitate the integration of academics and athletics is by
preventing student-athletes from being cut off from the broader
campus community,” and that “[a]s with the NCAA’s amateurism
justification . . . the NCAA may not use this goal to justify its
sweeping prohibition on any student-athlete compensation, paid
now or in the future . . . .”68 Thus, the court concluded that
limited restrictions on student-athlete compensation may help
schools to achieve this narrow procompetitive goal.69

not even address the importance of athlete education, which “the NCAA now
considers the primary motivation for participating in intercollegiate athletics”).
65. See id. at *28–30 (considering the flaws of and rejecting a survey
indicating that viewers would be less likely to watch college football if athletes
were paid); id. at *82 (noting that the NCAA’s expert witness “did not ask
respondents for their opinions about providing student-athletes with a share of
the licensing revenues generated from the use of their own names, images, and
likenesses,” among other flaws in his surveying methodologies).
66. See id. at *37–40 (weighing the evidence supporting and rejecting the
claim that restrictions on compensation help student-athletes integrate into
college communities).
67. Id. at *39, *86.
68. Id. at *86–88.
69. See id. at *87 (noting the benefits of limited restrictions).
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3. Allegedly Less Restrictive Alternatives
Upon finding the NCAA to have shown very limited
procompetitive effects to its wage restraints on college athletes,
the court finally turned to the issue of whether these
procompetitive benefits could be achieved in a less restrictive
manner.70 Here, the plaintiffs proposed three less restrictive
alternatives to the NCAA’s blanket prohibition on student-athlete
pay: (1) raising the permissible grant-in-aid limit that schools
may award to their athletes in stipends; (2) allowing NCAA
member schools to hold in trust for their athletes a limited and
equal share of licensing revenues; and (3) permitting studentathletes
to
receive
compensation
from
third-party
71
endorsements.
With respect to the first proposal—raising the permissible
grant-in-aid limit that schools may award to their athletes in
stipends—the court found the alternative would limit the
anticompetitive effects without harming NCAA interests because
“[a] stipend capped at the cost of attendance would not violate the
NCAA’s own definition of amateurism [as] it would only cover
educational expenses.”72 Noting that “the NCAA member schools
used to provide student-athletes with similar stipends before the
NCAA lowered its cap on grant-in-aid,” the court further found
that “none of the evidence presented at trial suggests that
consumer demand for the NCAA’s product would decrease if
schools were to provide such stipends to student-athletes once
again.”73 To the contrary, the court found that “[i]f anything,
providing student-athletes with such stipends would [better meet
the NCAA’s stated goals of integrating student-athletes into
general academic life] by removing some of the educational
expenses that they would otherwise have to bear, such as school
supplies, which are not covered by a full grant-in-aid.”74

70. See id. at *89–94 (noting the court’s analysis of benefits in a less
restrictive manner).
71. See id. at *43–48 (describing the plaintiff’s alternatives).
72. Id. at *44.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *44–45.
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Regarding the second alternative—allowing schools to hold
limited payments in trust for student-athletes—the court
similarly found this to enable the NCAA to achieve its stated
goals in a less restrictive manner, as long as the compensation
was limited and distributed equally among team members.75 In
addition, the court found the evidence failed to show that
allowing payments of this nature would hurt consumer demand
for college sports, as long as these payments were limited in
amount, equal for all players based on the use of their names,
images, and likenesses, and not actually paid to the athletes until
after they left school.76 Finally, the court found that “holding
compensation in trust for student-athletes while they are enrolled
would not erect any new barriers to schools’ efforts to educate
student-athletes or integrate them into their schools’ academic
communities.”77
Nevertheless, with respect to the third alternative—
permitting student-athletes to receive compensation from thirdparty endorsements—the court found this outcome did not offer a
less restrictive way for the NCAA to achieve its stated goals.78 To
the contrary, the court concluded that “[a]llowing studentathletes to endorse commercial products would undermine the
efforts of both the NCAA and its member schools to protect
against the ‘commercial exploitation’ of student athletes” even
though much evidence at trial indicated that the NCAA itself
does not always act in a manner to protect such exploitation.79
The findings of fact further noted that “[p]laintiffs themselves
previously indicated that they were not seeking to enjoin the
NCAA from enforcing its current rules prohibiting such
endorsements”—thus indicating this restraint may have been

75. Id. at *45.
76. Id. at *45–46.
77. Id. at *46.
78. Id. at *47.
79. See id. at *47–48 (“Although the trial record contains evidence—and
Dr. Emmert himself acknowledged—that the NCAA has not always succeeded
in protecting student-athletes from commercial exploitation, this failure does
not justify expanding opportunities for commercial exploitation of studentathletes in the future.”).
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viewed differently by the court if the plaintiffs had proposed this
remedy from the very beginning.80
B. Permanent Injunction
Based upon the court’s legal findings, the court entered an
injunction to remove what it deemed to be the “unreasonable
elements” of the NCAA’s restraints, as were found in the case. 81
First, the court issued a permanent injunction, enjoining the
NCAA from enforcing any rules that “would prohibit its member
schools and conferences from offering their FBS football and
Division I [men’s] basketball recruits a limited share of the
revenues generated from the use of their names, images, and
likenesses, in addition to a full grant in aid.”82 The injunction,
however, still allowed the NCAA to cap the amount of pay
immediately available to student-athletes at the full cost of
attending college.83
In addition, the court enjoined the NCAA from “enforcing any
rules to prevent its member schools and conferences from offering
to deposit a limited share of licensing revenue in trust for their
FBS football and Division I basketball recruits, payable when
they leave school or their eligibility expires.”84 This part of the
injunction, however, was again limited to allow the NCAA to cap
the amount of money that may be held in trust annually for each
player at $5,000 (in 2014 dollars).85 The injunction also allows the
NCAA to enact and enforce a rule that ensures no school may
offer any recruit a greater share of the licensing revenue than
any other recruit in the same class, on the same team.86

80. Id. at *47.
81. Id. at *96.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at *96–97 (“[The injunction] will prohibit the NCAA from setting
a cap of less than five thousand dollars (in 2014 dollars) [on the amount of
money to be held in trust] for every year that the student-athlete remains
academically eligible to compete.”).
86. Id. at *97.
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Although the court is not entirely transparent about the
basis for this $5,000-per-year cap on athlete compensation, one
could surmise this amount is based in part on the NCAA expert
study about consumer reaction to paying college athletes, which
failed to test for consumer opposition to paying athletes less than
$20,000.87 It also seems based in part on testimony by NCAA
expert witness Neal Pilson that “he would not be troubled if
schools were allowed to make five thousand dollar payments to
their student-athletes . . . if the payments were held in trust.”88
IV. Why the District Court Was Correct to Find the NCAA’s
Restraints on Revenue Sharing to Violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act
Overall, the court’s decision in O’Bannon was a legally
sound win for the plaintiffs.89 The gravamen of the district court’s
ruling—that NCAA restraints on college-athlete pay violate
antitrust law—was omniscient in both its reasoning and its
outcome.90 While the decision was among the first to hold that the
NCAA’s “no pay” rules may violate antitrust law, the decision
indubitably conformed to the well-established antitrust principles
that have long been accepted by courts in the general sports
marketplace.91 For example, the decision recognized that an
87. See id. at *82 (“[The survey suggests that] the public’s attitudes toward
student-athlete compensation depend heavily on the level of compensation that
student-athletes would receive. This is consistent with the testimony of [the
NCAA’s expert witnesses], who both indicated that smaller payments to
student-athletes would bother them less than larger payments.”).
88. Id. at *45.
89. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining the proper
application of the rule of reason analysis); see Michael McCann, What Ed
O’Bannon’s Victory Over the NCAA Means Moving Forward, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
ONLINE
(Aug.
10,
2014),
http://www.si.com/collegebasketball/2014/08/09/ed-obannon-ncaa-claudia-wilken-appeal-name-imagelikeness-rights (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (describing the O’Bannon ruling as “a
significant, but carefully limited, legal victory for advocates of student athletes”) (on file with the Washington and Lee La w Review).
90. See infra Part V (explaining the limits of the O’Bannon holding).
91. See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (explaining the need to
evaluate Sherman Act claims on the competitive effects of regulations rather
than the needs of the industry’s members); see Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust
Exemption for the NCAA: Sound Public Policy or Letting the Fox Loose in the
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agreement among separate entities in the sports industry to
collectively fix athletes’ wages below the market rate produces a
substantial anticompetitive effect under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.92 This is a conclusion that has long been axiomatic in sportsantitrust cases where the defendants have been parties other
than the NCAA.93
The O’Bannon decision also helped to reconcile the
longstanding differences between the antitrust treatment of the
NCAA’s wage restraints with respect to players and coaches.94
Importantly, in Law v. NCAA,95 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that the NCAA’s attempt to cap assistant
coaches’ salaries below the free market rate produced substantially
anticompetitive effects under antitrust law.96 Presuming that the
Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Law was indeed good law, the same
conclusion should logically have always extended to wage restraints
for FBS football players and Division I men’s basketball players,

Henhouse, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 229, 231 (2014) (noting that “[w]ith respect to
alleged anticompetitive restraints on student-athletes,” courts historically
“side[d] with the NCAA when its amateurism rules were challenged” even
though there is perhaps a legal basis to rule in the opposite direction).
92. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 50–66, O’Bannon, 2014
WL 3899815 (comparing the case at hand to a volume of jurisprudence and
concluding that the plaintiffs “presented sufficient evidence to show an
analogous anticompetitive effect in a similar labor market”).
93. See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law:
Why the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 61, 76 (2013) (noting that wage fixing by sports leagues with
market power is typically seen as illegal); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its
Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist, 86 OR. L. REV.
329, 359 (2007) (explaining that the NCAA amateurism rules and limits on
athlete compensation represent “a quintessential example of a horizontal price
restraint”); cf. Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061–62 (D.C. 1995)
(explaining that because athletic prowess is a unique and highly specialized
resource, “[i]f team owners join together to suppress the price of athletic services
through monopsony practices, most athletes will not be able to switch profitably
to other lines of work,” making the market susceptible to monopsony).
94. See infra note 166 and accompanying text (arguing that because
student-athletes are not paid, the salaries and endorsement opportunities
offered to coaches are disproportionately high).
95. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
96. See id. at 1020 (“Under [the quick look rule of reason], the undisputed
evidence supports a finding of anticompetitive effect.”).
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given that both categories “are closely akin in practice to traditional
workers.”97
Furthermore, the district court’s ruling in O’Bannon accurately
interpreted the 1984 Supreme Court decision NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma98 in light of both its
underlying context, and the factual realities about the college sports
marketplace.99 Despite the NCAA’s longstanding contentions to the
contrary, the Board of Regents decision stands foremost for the
proposition that collective action by NCAA member schools is
subject to antitrust scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act.100
97. See Edelman, supra note 93, at 77 (noting that the average Division I
college football player devotes on average over forty hours per week to his
sport—more time than the typical U.S. worker spends practicing his profession).
See Robert McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the StudentAthlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 74 (2006) (“[The]
characterization—that athletes at NCAA-member schools are studentathletes—is essential to the NCAA because it obscures the legal reality that
some of these athletes, in fact, are also employees.”). The McCormicks go on to
argue that
[b]y creating and fostering the myth that football and men’s
basketball players at Division I universities are something other than
employees, the NCAA and its member institutions obtain the
astonishing pecuniary gain and related benefits of the athletes’
talents, time, and energy—that is, their labor—while severely
curtailing the costs associated with such labor.
Id.
98. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
99. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 79–80, O’Bannon, 2014
WL 3899815 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014)
Plaintiffs have also presented ample evidence here to show that the
college sports industry has changed substantially in the thirty years
since Board of Regents was decided. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s
incidental phrase in Board of Regents does not establish that the
NCAA’s current restraints on compensation are procompetitive and
without less restrictive alternatives.
100. See id. at *79–80 (explaining in detail why even though “the NCAA has
cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents as support for its
amateurism justification, its reliance on the case remains unavailing”); see also
Edelman, supra note 93, at 79 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 108 (1984) (supporting this same conclusion)); Lazaroff,
supra note 91, at 239 (explaining that without an antitrust exemption, the
NCAA is rightful to be concerned about antitrust liability in light of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in NCAA v. Board of Regents); Note, Sherman Act
Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1301
(1992) [hereinafter Sherman Act Note] (footnote omitted) (“Most significantly,
the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma

DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN O’BANNON

2341

It does not stand for the proposition that certain NCAA restraints
are per se legal.101
Finally, the district court in O’Bannon also did not fall victim
to any of the errors that had plagued past courts when reviewing
the wage restraints the NCAA imposed against its athletes.102
Many past decisions had mistakenly applied a bifurcated test to
determine whether NCAA rules were subject to antitrust law—
placing “business rules” within the scope of antitrust scrutiny and
“eligibility rules” (such as those related to amateurism) on the

held that NCAA actions are subject to antitrust scrutiny and should be analyzed
under the ‘rule of reason’ . . . .”).
101. See Marc Edelman, The NCAA’s Death Penalty Sanction—Reasonable
Self-Governance or an Illegal Group Boycott in Disguise, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 385, 413 (2014) (footnote omitted)
[I]t is an absurdity of construction to presume that the Supreme
Court’s statement that ‘most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA
are justifiable means of fostering competition’ is equivalent to a
finding that the NCAA conduct cannot yield an anticompetitive
effect—especially in light of the fact the Supreme Court in Board of
Regents ultimately found the NCAA’s broadcasting rules to be illegal;
Sherman Act Note, supra note 100, at 1301 (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court’s
decision in Board of Regents confirms that the amateurism bylaws are subject to
antitrust scrutiny”). As further explained in my law review article The NCAA’s
Death Penalty Sanction—Reasonable Self-Governance or an Illegal Group
Boycott in Disguise:
A closer inspection of the Board of Regents decision indicates that the
language cited by [cases that have found amateurism as a defense, in
itself, of anticompetitive conduct] does not truly mean what . . . these
courts purport it to mean. A closer inspection of the Board of Regents
decision indicates that the language cited by these cases came from a
section of the decision that explained why NCAA conduct should be
reviewed under the Rule of Reason rather than the per se test. In
addition, the language cited specifically states that NCAA
amateurism rules ‘can be used as procompetitive and not that they
‘must’ be viewed in such a light. By using the word ‘can’ rather than
‘must’ and using it in context of determining the proper Competitive
Effects Test for reviewing NCAA conduct, it is clear that the Supreme
Court in Board of Regents never actually reached any legal conclusion
in favor of specially preserving NCAA amateurism. All it did was note
the argument could have been broached by the NCAA as a defense
under the Rule of Reason.
102. See infra, notes 103–108 and accompanying text (identifying the
importance of weighing the competitive effects of regulation rather than the
benefits or disadvantages of enjoining the industry’s members from enacting
them).
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outside of scrutiny.103 The court in O’Bannon, however, properly
recognized that even the NCAA’s amateurism rules were subject
to antitrust law because, as a matter of economic reality, these
rules substantially impact commerce.104 Furthermore, whereas
other past courts had allowed the NCAA to defend its otherwise
anticompetitive restraints based on the mere claims of
“preserving amateurism”105 and providing “an opportunity for
competition among amateur students pursuing a collegiate
education,”106 the court in O’Bannon disagreed, holding that
“[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that antitrust defendants
cannot
rely on . . . social welfare benefits
to
justify
anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act.”107 Thus, the
103. See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that
“many district courts have held that the Sherman Act does not apply to the
NCAA’s promulgation and enforcement of eligibility requirements”), vacated,
NCAA v. Smith, 529 U.S. 459 (1999); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 497
(D.N.J. 1998) (noting that certain NCAA bylaws related to athlete eligibility
were non-commercial); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743 (M.D. Tenn.
1990) (presuming a legal difference in treatment under antitrust law “between
the NCAA’s efforts to restrict the televising of college football games and the
NCAA’s efforts to maintain a discernible line between amateurism and
professionalism”).
104. See Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motion to Dismiss, O’Bannon v.
NCAA, Nos. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010)
(finding that the plaintiffs in O’Bannon had met their burden with respect to
pleading an impact on interstate commerce); see also Edelman, supra note 93, at
63, 88–89 (noting that NCAA oversees a nearly $11 billion college sports
industry with colleges producing yearly revenues upwards of $100 million;
television rights for events like NCAA men’s basketball tournaments make
upwards of $750 million yearly; and NCAA schools receive millions of dollars
from stadium and players’ equipment advertising rights); Gabe Feldman, A
Modest Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 249, 254–55
(2014) (explaining that the “‘myth of amateurism’ [improperly] ignores the fact
that the NCAA has become a profit-seeking enterprise that governs multi-billion
dollar entertainment products”); J.G. Joakim Soederbaum, Comment, Leveling
the Playing Field—Balancing Student-Athletes’ Short- and Long-Term Financial
Interests with Educational Institutions’ Interests in Avoiding NCAA Sanctions,
24 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 261, 277 (2013) (noting that NCAA members schools,
despite their claims of amateurism and non-commercialism, willingly “partake
in the lucrative athletic endorsement field”).
105. Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 (D. Ariz. 1983).
106. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1992).
107. Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment; Granting
Motion to Amend Class Definition; Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig., No. C-09-1967-CW, 2014 WL 1410451, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014)
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O’Bannon decision properly acknowledged that under the modern
view of antitrust law, “even a positive, noneconomic motive can
no longer save an otherwise [anticompetitive] restraint.”108
V. Why the District Court’s Permanent Injunction in O’Bannon
Was Insufficient, and Does Not Fully Ameliorate the NCAA’s
Restraints
While the district court’s reasoning in O’Bannon was both
legally sound and societally groundbreaking, the permanent
injunction implemented by the court was nevertheless limited
and weak, as it failed to ameliorate the NCAA’s anticompetitive
practices as effectively as possible.109 Indeed, the only alleged
procompetitive benefits to which the court ascribed any merit
related to links between the NCAA’s ‘no pay’ rules and both the
popularity of college sports and the quality of students’
educations.110 Nevertheless, the court’s injunction in O’Bannon
seemed to allow NCAA practices that did not clearly and
substantially benefit either of these areas.111
Perhaps it would have made more sense for the court to have
simply enjoined the NCAA’s restraints outright, without crafting
a complex system of restraints on college-athlete pay that the
court deemed less restrictive.112 Although antitrust law’s Rule of
(citing FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990)).
108. Edelman, supra note 93, at 92; see also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (noting that any proper rule of reason
analysis must turn on the competitive effects of the restraint and not on
whether the restraint is “in the interest of the members of [the] industry”).
109. See infra notes 110–11 (explaining the practices which are permitted by
the injunction but offer dubious procompetitive effects). See generally McCann,
supra note 89 (noting that the court’s injunction allowing for payment of college
athletes up to $5,000 per year “is not quite the all-encompassing change that
some NCAA critics sought”).
110. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 78–89, O’Bannon v.
NCAA, No. C-09-3329 CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (discussing procompetitive
justifications).
111. Cf. Sherman Act Note, supra note 100, at 1312 (finding that limits on
college-athlete pay are “not tailored to the goal of promoting intercollegiate
athletics because many NCAA institutions frequently violate the rule,” and
“[t]he public knows these violations occur, but the product of college sports in
the economic marketplace continues to increase in popularity”).
112. See infra notes 113–19 and accompanying text (offering less limited
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Reason has been described as “[o]ne of the most amorphous rules
in antitrust,”113 the court in O’Bannon did not necessarily have to
adopt one of the less restrictive alternatives suggested by the
plaintiffs.114 Rather, the court could have simply recognized that
under a “balancing test” the NCAA’s longstanding restraints on
college-athlete pay far exceeded any alleged procompetitive
justifications, and thus the court could have entirely enjoined the
NCAA’s ‘no pay’ restraints.115 If the court in O’Bannon had
simply overturned the NCAA’s ‘no pay’ rules, anarchy would not
have ensued throughout college sports as the NCAA
incredulously suggests.116 Rather, the result would have been the
benign devolving of power from the NCAA overall to the various
individual athletic conferences.117 Such a result would have
alternatives to the court’s injunction and arguing their potential efficacy).
113. Carrier, supra note 35, at 827; see Peter C. Carstensen & Paul
Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes and the NCAA: Limiting the Scope
and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 545, 571 (1995)
(describing antitrust law’s Rule of Reason as “very ambiguous in practice”). See
generally Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 237 (explaining that “[t]he rule-of-reason
journey is an arduous one, and it can generate considerable expense and
substantial investment of time and money”).
114. See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative
Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009) (noting
that the Supreme Court has never adopted a less restrictive alternatives inquiry
as part of the Rule of Reason, and even the circuits that have adopted this
inquiry have generally not required it where a restraint does not have
meaningful procompetitive benefits and is thus otherwise already illegal); see
also Carrier, supra note 35, at 831 (noting that where an anticompetitive
restraint does not have any procompetitive benefits, the restraint is deemed
illegal without the need to assess the availability of less restrictive alternatives).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 243 (2d Cir.
2003) (upholding district court’s ruling enjoining a restraint under antitrust
law’s Rule of Reason based on bench trial findings that rule had an
anticompetitive effect in a relevant market, and that the defendants “failed to
show that the anticompetitive effects of their exclusionary rules are outweighed
by procompetitive benefits”); see also Carrier, supra note 35, at 831 (describing
the ruling in United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. as the “sole plaintiff victory” in
five reviewed instances during which the court applied true balancing).
116. See infra notes 117–19 and accompanying text (explaining why anarchy
would not ensue if a balancing test were used); see also Edelman, supra note 13,
at 1021 n.3 (providing a series of quotes from NCAA leaders arguing that
overturning the NCAA’s amateurism restraints would lead to anarchy).
117. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 13, at 1046 (discussing this option of
devolving power to the conference); Edelman, supra note 93, at 97 (“[R]ules
governing student-athlete pay at the conference level . . . would likely be far less
restrictive to student-athletes, colleges, and consumers because individual
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allowed “each individual conference to choose a common wage
regime . . . without the need for an overarching super-cartel to
control the entire market for college-age athletes.”118 It would
have continued to prevent an entirely free market for collegeathlete services, but would have still importantly allowed for
inter-conference competition determined by the free market
under traditional principles of supply and demand.119
Alternatively, if the court did not enjoin the NCAA’s
restraints outright, the court still, at a minimum, should have
implemented the third less restrictive alternative discussed in
the court’s opinion—allowing for college athletes to seek thirdparty compensation for the sale of their likenesses.120 Plaintiffs’
lawyers may have hurt their prospects of obtaining this
injunction by initially stating that they were not seeking a free
market for athlete endorsements, and by initially indicating that
their claim was only about creating a free market to sell their
names and likenesses to the NCAA.121 Nevertheless, an
injunction of this nature would have benefited the most elite
college athletes by providing them with the opportunity to obtain
financial security. In turn, this may have helped to integrate
these athletes into their academic communities by incentivizing

conferences lack sufficient ‘market power’ within any relevant market to
illegally restrain trade. Thus, each individual sports conference represents just
a small share of the college . . . sports marketplace.”).
118. Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, “Amateurism” in Big-Time
College Sports, 14 ANTITRUST 51, 54 (2000).
119. See Edelman, supra note 93, at 97
“[C]onference-wide salary caps on student-athlete pay are unlikely to
lead to a . . . ban of student-athlete compensation. [S]ome conferences
would likely opt to allow student-athletes to receive money as a
means to compete . . . for student-athlete labor . . . . [Others may]
recogniz[e]
that
taking
the
moral
high
ground
may
make . . . consumers more interested in [making] purchas[es] . . . .”
120. See infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (discussing pros and
cons of allowing athletes to seek third-party compensation for sale of
likenesses).
121. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 47, O’Bannon v. NCAA,
No. C-09-3329 CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (stating, in terms of evaluating the
proposed less restrictive alternative of allowing college athletes to receive money
for endorsement deals, that “[p]laintiffs themselves previously indicated that
they were not seeking to enjoin the NCAA from enforcing its current rules
prohibiting such endorsements”).
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them to stay in college for a full four years and work toward
earning their diplomas alongside their classmates.122
The argument that college athletes would be more likely to
stay in school for four years and earn their degrees if they were
allowed to engage in third party sponsorship deals is not a novel
one.123 It has long been established that the Division I college
football and men’s basketball players who are most likely to leave
school early to enter the professional ranks are those from lowincome families.124 Allowing these athletes to receive the full cost
of attendance is a step in the right direction; however, the sort of
money enabled by the O’Bannon injunction pales in comparison
to the amount that would have been available through thirdparty sponsorship opportunities.125 While a $5,000 per year
stipend may provide a college athlete ample money for food,
shelter and perhaps even the occasional movie, this sum is almost
certainly not enough to shift an elite college athlete’s priorities
away from imminently turning professional.126
122. See Marc Edelman, Note, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in
Men’s College Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 861, 863 (2002) (“By
colluding to restrain the financial opportunities of student-athletes, Amateurism
influences star college basketball players to leave school without graduating in
favor of professional leagues.”).
123. See, e.g., id. at 875 (“College basketball players, not sharing in the
revenue generated by their talents, are increasingly forgoing college in favor of
the NBA.”); cf. Michael A. Corgan, Comment, Permitting Student-Athletes to
Accept Endorsement Deals: A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College
Athletics Created by Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA’s RevenueGenerating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 415 (2012) (discussing how
allowing college athletes access to a free market for endorsements is likely to
meet their financial needs).
124. See Kenneth Shropshire, Compensation and the African American
Student-Athlete, in RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS, 272–73 (2000) (noting that
when considering the low graduation rates of African-American athletes in
Division I men’s basketball and FBS football, the reality of race as a near proxy
for familiar wealth needs to be considered).
125. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 122, at 876 (noting that even more than
fifteen years ago, basketball star Tracy McGrady was able to sign a six-year, $12
million endorsement deal immediately out of high school, before even playing in
a professional game).
126. See id. at 885–86 (discussing a deregulation model as a solution);
Michael Corgan, supra note 123, at 415 (concluding that “[p]roviding studentathletes with thirty to fifty dollars per month (or $360 to $600 a year) would not
lessen the desire for poor student-athletes to accept thousands of dollars from
sports agents,” but “[a]llowing student-athletes to seek lucrative endorsement
deals . . . [would provide] an ample amount of money”).
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Furthermore, allowing college athletes to sponsor products or
sell their publicity rights brings the treatment of college athletes
in line with non-athletes on college campuses, whose private
ventures are not regulated.127 To the extent that procompetitive
benefits truly emanate from college athletes engaging with the
mainstream academic community, allowing college athletes to
engage in the same unregulated lifestyle as traditional students
represents an important step in the right direction.128 In addition,
allowing elite college athletes to license the rights to their
likenesses to third parties enables these athletes to obtain
business and negotiation experience that may be directly relevant
to their course work—should they pursue studies in strategic
management, marketing, or sports management.
VI. Implications of the O’Bannon Decision and Logical Next Steps
Some advocates for college-athlete rights have expressed
disappointment over the outcome in O’Bannon v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association—believing that the court’s
injunction did not go far enough to protect the interests of college
athletes. Nevertheless, the U.S. District Court’s decision in
O’Bannon is unlikely to serve as the last word in the dispute over
college-athlete compensation.129 The stark contrast between the
court’s holding and the limited nature of its injunction may lead

127. See Jon Solomon, Can Congress (Yes, Congress) Help NCAA Find
Solutions?, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/college
football/writer/jon-solomon/24666147/can-congress-yes-congress-help-ncaa-findsolutions (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (noting that Jo Potuto believes “the NCAA
should have no rule banning players from using their name and likeness to be
paid,” likening such pay “to actress Emma Watson being paid for appearing in
movies while a student at Brown and still participating in theater performances
at the university”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See
Edelman, supra note 122, at 884 (explaining why stipends “fail to provide young
basketball players enough money to keep them from leaving the NCAA for the
NBA”).
128. See supra notes 105–23 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits
of allowing college athletes the same unregulated lifestyle as classmates).
129. See infra notes 130–95 and accompanying text (discussing both parties’
grounds for appeal in O’Bannon, subject matter for subsequent lawsuits against
the NCAA, impact of O’Bannon on unionizing and Title IX compliance, and
potential for a statutory antitrust exemption).
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to an appeal of the decision by both parties.130 Meanwhile, the
decision also may lead to various new class action lawsuits
involving NCAA amateurism rules, as well as strategic changes
to the college-athlete unionization efforts, new concerns about
Title IX compliance, and even an attempt by NCAA leaders to
secure from Congress a statutory exemption from U.S. antitrust
law.131
A. Grounds for an NCAA Appeal
Within days of the district court’s ruling in O’Bannon, the
NCAA already had indicated plans to appeal the court’s
decision.132 The anticipated NCAA appeal may argue that, as a
matter of law, the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents
precludes any antitrust challenges related to NCAA eligibility
rules, including challenges related to college athlete ‘no pay’
rules.133 To support this argument, the NCAA may rely upon
three appellate decisions from other circuits that interpret Board
of Regents in a manner more favorable to the NCAA’s position.134

130. See infra notes 132–54 and accompanying text (discussing the grounds
for appeal for each O’Bannon party).
131. See infra notes 155–95 and accompanying text (discussing subject
matter for subsequent lawsuits against the NCAA, impact of O’Bannon on
unionizing and Title IX compliance, and potential for a statutory antitrust
exemption).
132. See, e.g., Steve Berkowitz & Thomas O’Toole, NCAA Seeks Clarification
Prior to Appeal of O’Bannon Case, USA TODAY (Aug. 11, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/08/10/ed-obannon-ncaaappeal-court-ruling-images-likenesses/13860823 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
(indicating the NCAA’s intent to appeal the district court’s ruling in O’Bannon)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael Marot, Emmert
Says NCAA Will Appeal O’Bannon Ruling, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 10, 2014),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/emmert-says-ncaa-will-appeal-obannon-ruling-1
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (quoting NCAA president Mark Emmert that “[n]o
one on our legal team or the college conferences’ legal teams think this is a
violation of antitrust laws and we need to get that settled in the courts,” and
Donald Remy, stating he would take the case to the Supreme Court) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See infra notes 134–40 and accompanying text (discussing appellate
decisions the NCAA may use to support its argument).
134. See infra notes 135–40 and accompanying text (listing the three
appellate decisions).
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First, in Smith v. NCAA,135 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that “the Sherman Act does not apply to the
NCAA’s
promulgation
and
enforcement
of
eligibility
requirements” because these requirements are not commercial in
nature.136 In McCormack v. NCAA,137 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that rules that determine who is eligible
to compete in college football games “enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics” and are consequently procompetitive.138
Meanwhile, in Banks v. NCAA,139 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that NCAA rules about player eligibility
are procompetitive because “the NCAA does not exist as a minor
league training ground for future NFL players but rather to
provide an opportunity for competition among amateur students
pursuing a collegiate education.”140
None of these three decisions, however, is binding on the
courts in the Ninth Circuit. In addition, each of these three
decisions is suspect in its legal reasoning.141 Although the court in
Smith concluded that the NCAA’s amateurism rules were not
“interstate commerce,” the Supreme Court’s ruling in Board of
Regents recognized the exact opposite—that NCAA rules meet the
“interstate commerce” requirement and are thus subject to review

135. 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
136. Id. at 185.
137. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
138. Id. at 1344 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 117 (1984)). The court in McCormack further cited directly to Board of
Regents for the proposition that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering
competition . . . .” Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 102 (1984)).
139. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
140. Id. at 1089–90 (preserving an NCAA rule that disallows college athletes
who had previously entered a professional sports league’s draft in that same
sport).
141. See infra notes 142–52 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws in
the legal reasoning of each decision). See Lazaroff, supra note 93, at 340 (noting
that since the Supreme Court decision in Board of Regents “lower federal courts
[in some circuits have] seized the opportunity to treat NCAA player restraints in
a significantly different manner” and have adopted “a more deferential
approach” to the NCAA than is seen otherwise in sports antitrust
jurisprudence).
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on their competitive merits.142 Furthermore, as a factual matter,
“intercollegiate athletics in its management is clearly business,
and big business at that.”143 Currently, the NCAA represents an
$11 billion industry with numerous colleges producing revenues
upwards of $100 million per year.144 Even some NCAA member
schools nowadays produce annual revenues upwards of $100
million from their athletics programs.145
Similarly, the court’s reasoning in McCormack was likely
flawed because it “gerrymandered the language in Board of
Regents to rule in favor of the NCAA.”146 The language quoted in
McCormack in favor of finding the NCAA’s eligibility rules
procompetitive specifically “came from a section of Board of
Regents that explained why NCAA conduct should be reviewed

142. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984);
see Edelman, supra note 93, at 88 (explaining that under the principles of the
Supreme Court decision in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc.,
444 U.S. 232 (1980), “the only thing a plaintiff must demonstrate to meet the
threshold issue of ‘interstate commerce’ is a ‘substantial effect on interstate
commerce generated by [a defendant’s general business activities]’”); see also
Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 113, at 567–68 (“The conclusion is
inescapable that the NCAA is a private organization engaged in the restraint of
economic competition in intercollegiate athletics programs, and so is necessarily
within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.”).
143. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977); see Lazaroff,
supra note 93, at 352 (concluding that “the line of demarcation between
professional and intercollegiate athletics is not as clear as some would have it,
and NCAA regulations directed at student-athletes should be properly
characterized as more commercial in nature than earlier case law suggests”).
144. See Edelman, supra note 93, at 63 (noting that “some NCAA members
have become increasingly wealthy—grossing annual revenues upwards of $100
million per year” and that “in 2010, a twelve-team athletic conference collected
more than $1 billion in athletic receipts”); see also Where Does the Money Go?,
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Answers/Nine+
points+to+consider_one (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (accessed by entering the
URL in the Internet Archive index) (“[The] annual revenue for college athletics
programs was estimated for 2008–09 at about $10.6 billion.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
145. Edelman, supra note 93, at 63; see also NCAA Finances, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/schools/finances (last visited Nov. 18,
2014) (listing thirteen NCAA member colleges with annual revenues exceeding
$100 million, topped by the University of Texas with $165.7 million in annual
revenues) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. Edelman, supra note 93, at 94 (citing McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d
1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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under the full rule of reason rather than the per se test.” 147
Furthermore, the exact language cited in McCormack, as quoted
from Board of Regents, actually states that the NCAA’s
amateurism rules . . . ‘can’ be viewed as procompetitive.”148 “By
using the word ‘can’ rather than ‘must,’” the Supreme Court was
not declaring that all NCAA amateurism rules were
procompetitive as a matter of law.149 Rather, the Court was
simply leaving open the possibility that, upon a full factual
inquiry, many of the NCAA’s amateurism restraints might
ultimately be found procompetitive.
Lastly, the court in Banks misconstrued the language from
Board of Regents in the same manner as McCormack—error that
was pointed out by the Honorable Joel Flaum in his robust
dissent to that case.150 Even Supreme Court Justice Harry
Blackmun seemed to agree with the dissent’s view in Banks.151 In
a bench memorandum that assessed whether to grant certiorari,
Justice Blackmun wrote by hand “CA7 got this one dead
wrong.”152 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court never granted
certiorari in the case.
B. Grounds for a Plaintiffs’ Appeal
The plaintiffs in O’Bannon also may attempt to appeal based
on the decision’s limited practical benefits to elite college
athletes.153 It is odd to think that, as a matter of law, an
agreement among NCAA members to pay their athletes $0 for the
rights to use their likenesses would constitute illegal wage fixing,
but an agreement to cap athlete payments for these rights at

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
102 (1984)).
150. See Banks v. NCAA. 977 F.2d 1081, 1098–99 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J.,
dissenting) (stating the steps that Banks would have to take under Board of
Regents and other case law to prove his claim).
151. See infra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Blackmun’s reaction to the Banks outcome).
152. Edelman, supra note 93, at 95 (citations omitted).
153. See id. at 76 (suggesting alternatives to the no-pay rule).
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$5,000 per year could potentially still be deemed
procompetitive.154
Nevertheless, the iconoclastic nature of the court’s ruling in
O’Bannon seems to arise from the plaintiffs’ own failure to
introduce evidence showing that payments to college athletes
exceeding $5,000 per year would benefit consumers in any
relevant market. Furthermore, Judge Wilken’s decision leaves
open the possibility that future litigation will lead to a far
broader injunction against NCAA pay restraints. This would
happen if future plaintiffs can introduce better evidence showing
that restraints on college-athlete pay harm consumers by denying
them the ability to monetarily voice their preferences for
particular college football and basketball recruits signing with
colleges in their home markets.
Should the plaintiffs in O’Bannon choose to appeal the
decision, they will likely face an uphill battle of challenging the
district court’s ruling in light of their failure to produce evidence
that lifting the restraints on college-athlete pay beyond $5,000
per year would benefit consumers overall. Had the plaintiffs
produced even a single expert report showing that fan interest in
college sports would have remained stable in a truly free market
for college athletes’ services, the plaintiffs would have been in a
far better position to appeal the district court’s ruling as a matter
of law.
C. Subject Matter for Subsequent Lawsuits Against the NCAA
As referenced in the previous section, the district court’s
decision in O’Bannon may further impact a number of other
lawsuits currently under review by the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, as well as encourage the filing of
new lawsuits against the NCAA based on slightly different
antitrust theories.155 One notable antitrust lawsuit currently
154. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59
(1940) (“Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may
be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their
reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat
to the central nervous system of the economy.”).
155. See infra notes 156–67 and accompanying text (discussing a current
lawsuit and the potential of future lawsuits).
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under review by the same district court is Jenkins v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association.156 This lawsuit seeks to overturn
NCAA rules “placing a ceiling on the compensation that may be
paid to [college] athletes for their services.”157 It specifically
alleges that colleges competing in FBS football and Division I
basketball contests have illegally conspired to deny their athletes
the ability to sell their athletic services to colleges in a free
market.158
Although some legal commentators have opined that the
Jenkins lawsuit is “doomed for failure” based on the district
court’s limited remedy in O’Bannon,159 such a conclusion is overly
simplified if not downright inaccurate. To the contrary, the legal
holding in O’Bannon explicates that the NCAA’s restraints on
college-athlete pay have strong anticompetitive effects,160 albeit
also perhaps some procompetitive benefits.161 Because the
restraints on college-athlete compensation exceeding $5,000 per
year remain unsettled by the O’Bannon decision, the Jenkins
lawsuit gives a new class of antitrust plaintiffs the chance to
demonstrate that the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s
restraints—even with respect to payments exceeding $5,000 per
year—cannot be offset by their procompetitive benefits.162
156. Complaint at 1, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 14-cv-02758-CW, (D.N.J. Mar.
17, 2014).
157. Id. at 2.
158. Id. at 3.
159. See Michael McCann, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/McCannSportsLaw/
status/499581988656140288 (Aug. 13, 2014) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
(tweeting that “[t]op sports lawyer Alan Milstein: O’Bannon ruling doesn’t help
Jeffrey Kessler lawsuit, which ‘is doomed for failure’”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
160. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09–3329 CW, 2014 WL 3899815, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 8, 2014) (explaining that the agreement among schools to attribute zero
value to a student-athlete’s name, image, and likeness harms the studentathlete and creates an anticompetitive effect).
161. See id. at *36 (“Although the rules do yield some limited procompetitive
benefits by marginally increasing consumer demand for the NCAA’s product and
improving the educational services provided to student-athletes, plaintiffs have
identified less restrictive ways of achieving these benefits.”).
162. See Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 3:14-cv-01678 (D.N.J.
complaint filed Mar. 17, 2014) (alleging that the ceiling on athlete pay created
by NCAA restrictions is a pernicious and blatant violation of antitrust law,
which has no legitimate procompetitive justification).
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The Jenkins plaintiffs further enjoy the benefit of learning
from the mistakes the O’Bannon plaintiffs made in strategizing
their case. While the O’Bannon plaintiffs produced no meaningful
evidence to rebut the NCAA expert’s findings of an inverse
correlation between athlete pay and consumer demand, the
Jenkins plaintiffs will have a fresh opportunity to commission an
expert report to rebut these findings.163 If the Jenkins plaintiffs
are able to produce meaningful evidence to rebut the presumption
of an inverse correlation between athlete pay and consumer
interest in college sports, it could reasonably lead to the
conclusion that the NCAA’s amateurism rules do not aid
consumer demand and thus have no procompetitive virtue.164 In
such an event, a court might ultimately overturn the NCAA’s
restraints outright.
Beyond Jenkins, a slightly different legal theory under which
a plaintiff could challenge the NCAA “no pay” rules may allege
that the NCAA rules that prevent college athletes from endorsing
products restrain trade in various sports celebrity endorsement
markets.165 A challenge of this nature might also allege that the
NCAA’s restraints in endorsement markets lead to windfall
profits for college coaches who, based upon these restraints, do
not have to compete against their own athletes for
endorsement/promotional opportunities within their local college
communities.166 Although the court in O’Bannon did not order
163. See O’Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815 at *11 (noting that the plaintiffs did
not produce a rebuttal report to Dr. Dennis’s report, which indicated an inverse
correlation between college–athlete pay and fan interest).
164. Cf. Lazaroff, supra note 93, at 359–60 (suggesting that a potential
source for such evidence may arise from a showing that even when “illicit
payments in violation of NCAA regulation have been uncovered repeatedly over
the years . . . [such] violations of NCAA amateurism rules . . . have not
diminished student, faculty, or alumni support for successful college football or
basketball teams”); Sherman Act Note, supra note 100, at 1313 (suggesting that
“[c]onsumer demand for college sports does not decline when violations of the
rule are exposed,” and that “the quality of the sports programs and the athletes’
affiliations with educational institutions appear to be the only two factors that
affect consumer demand for college sports”).
165. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text (explaining the drastic
difference between the compensation available to student-athletes after
O’Bannon and the compensation that would be available if student-athletes
could endorse products).
166. See Edelman, supra note 122, at 862 (arguing that because studentathletes are not paid, the salaries and endorsement opportunities offered to
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deregulation of the third-party endorsement markets, a
subsequent lawsuit under this theory might achieve a more
favorable result if the plaintiffs are able to show that some
businesses would seek to hire college-athlete endorsers if they
were not precluded from doing so by the NCAA bylaws.167
Furthermore, a direct challenge to the NCAA rules
forbidding college athletes from endorsing products is likely to
succeed on its antitrust merits because the NCAA could not easily
argue that there are any procompetitive benefits to restraining
third-party endorsement markets. It would be difficult for the
NCAA to argue that a free market for college athletes endorsing
products would harm consumer demand for attending college
sporting events because other sporting events such as the
Olympic Games have not lost popularity after beginning to allow
athletes to endorse third-party products. In addition, allowing
college athletes to endorse third-party products would not
necessarily lead to athlete disengagement from the broader
educational community, as many college students who are
famous for pursuits other than sports currently endorse products
without it interfering with their overall college experience.
D. Impact of the O’Bannon Ruling on College-Athlete Unionizing
and Title IX Compliance
The ruling in O’Bannon simultaneously creates a possibility
for changes in legal strategies pertaining to college-athlete
unionizing efforts and Title IX compliance.168 In terms of
unionizing, from the players’ perspective the O’Bannon decision
coaches are disproportionality high); see also id. at 874 (“Since student-athletes
are not allowed to profit from their skills, men’s college basketball revenues
create a windfall of payments to league administrators, directors, and
coaches.”).
167. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09–3329 CW, 2014 WL 3899815 at *17 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (rejecting the third alleged less restrictive alternative of
allowing for a free market for college athletes to sell their services to third
parties).
168. See infra notes 169–81 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
benefits student-athletes may appreciate if they unionize and discussing why
Title IX claims are unlikely to succeed).
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could discourage such efforts based on an earnest belief that
antitrust law, and not labor law, is the best way to secure
financial gains.169 Although the permanent injunction issued in
O’Bannon creates only an immediate upside of modest financial
gains, FBS football and Division I men’s basketball players may
look to the upcoming Jenkins litigation as the potential case that
could break meaningful ground toward a free market for college
athletes’ services.170
By contrast, some NCAA leaders may view the O’Bannon
ruling as creating a stronger basis to support the FBS football
players and Division I men’s basketball players unionizing efforts
as long as these efforts occur as part of a multiemployer
bargaining unit.171 The reason being, if college football and men’s
basketball players unionize as part of a multiemployer
bargaining unit, the NCAA would incur an immediate obligation
to bargain with these athletes over the mandatory terms and
conditions of employment—hours, wages, and general working
conditions.172 This, in turn, would grant the NCAA the benefit of
antitrust law’s non-statutory labor exemption—thus allowing for
collective bargaining over athlete pay without the risk of any
further antitrust liability.173
169. See infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing how if the players
unionize, it may take away their rights under antitrust law based on the nonstatutory labor exemption). See generally Lazaroff, supra note 13 (concluding
that if college athletes are permitted to unionize by the National Labor
Relations Board, “the non-statutory labor exemption will come into play”).
170. See supra notes 156–64 and accompanying text (describing the Jenkins
lawsuit).
171. See infra notes 172–73 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits
of unionizing).
172. See N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349
(1958) (explaining that the National Labor Relations Act establishes “the
obligation of the employer and the representative of its employees to bargain
with each other in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment”). The Court further reasoned that “[t]he duty is
limited to those subjects, and within that area neither party is legally obligated
to yield.” Id.
173. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996) (recognizing
an exemption from antitrust laws when unionized employees bargain in good
faith with their employers over hours, wages, and working conditions). This
“exemption recognizes that, to give effect to federal labor laws and policies and
to allow meaningful collective bargaining to take place, some restraints on
competition imposed through the bargaining process must be shielded from
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Meanwhile, in terms of Title IX compliance, some NCAA
members currently may be reluctant to raise scholarship levels to
the true cost of attendance for only FBS football and men’s
basketball players based on the fear of lawsuits challenging this
practice under Title IX.174 Indeed, if certain colleges increase
their scholarship amounts to the true cost of attendance for male
college athletes but not for female athletes, this pricing practice
may very well present some Title IX risk.
Nevertheless, the risk of an NCAA member school violating
Title IX by “paying” its athletes a share of their name, image and
likeness revenues should be viewed as substantially lower than
simply offering unequal scholarship amounts—especially if
colleges pay different amounts to athletes based on the actual
free market value for their services/likenesses.175 In past court
decisions, Title IX’s requirements as related to equal pay have
been generally interpreted as “coextensive with the
antidiscrimination provisions that appear in the Equal Pay Act of
1963 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”176 Thus, disparate pay for
male and female athletes is likely permissible under Title IX as
long as the male athletes’ job descriptions involve greater skill,
effort, or responsibility than the female athletes’ job
descriptions.177
antitrust sanctions.” Id. Further, the Court explained that the non-statutory
labor exemption arises because “as a matter of logic, it would be difficult . . . to
require groups of employers and employees to bargain together, but at the same
time to forbid them to make . . . any of the competition-restricting agreements
potentially necessary to make the process work or its results mutually
acceptable.” Id.
174. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§1681–
1688 (2012) (discussing obligations of equal educational opportunities for
students, irrespective of their gender).
175. See infra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (discussing why the risk
of a Title IX claim based on disparate pay between male and female athletes is
unlikely to succeed).
176. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1051; see John Gaal et al., Gender-Based
Pay Disparities in Intercollegiate Coaching: The Legal Issues, 28 J.C. & U.L.
519, 545 (2002) (explaining that “the few courts that have addressed Title IX as
an independent employment discrimination statute in the context of [college]
coaches’ compensation have not viewed it as any broader than the [Equal Pay
Act] . . . .”); Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that the plaintiff’s Title IX claim fails for the same reasons as her
Equal Pay Act claim fails).
177. Thus, disparate compensation of male and female student-athletes
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Based on the foregoing, there is a reasonable argument that
if individual athletes were to receive a salary or stipend based on
the economic value they generate for their particular athletic
programs, FBS football and Division I men’s basketball players’
jobs would be found to involve greater skill, effort and
responsibility than the jobs of their non-revenue producing
counterparts in other sports.178 The case that seems to best
support the point is Stanley v. University of Southern
California.179 There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit rejected a motion to enjoin the University of Southern
California from providing higher pay to its men’s basketball coach
than its female coach on the ground that the revenues generated
by the men’s basketball team is “90 times greater than the
revenue generated by the women’s basketball team.”180 Although
would be permissible under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 as
long as the male student-athletes’ job descriptions involved greater skill, effort,
and responsibility than the female student-athletes’ job descriptions. Edelman,
supra note 13, at 1051.
178. See id. at 1052 (arguing that male student-athletes’ jobs indeed involve
greater skill, effort, and responsibility for purposes of pay discrimination laws
because male student-athletes in football and men’s basketball typically
generate substantially higher revenues for their colleges from the use of their
names and likenesses than do female student-athletes”); see also Jon Gaal et al.,
supra note 176, at 527 (“Courts have recognized that differences in revenue
production and media expectations can provide evidence of a difference in
responsibilities sufficient to preclude a finding of ‘equal work.’”); Stanley v.
Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The responsibility to
produce a large amount of revenue is evidence of a substantial difference in
responsibility.”); Jacobs v. Coll. of William & Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D.
Va. 1980), aff’d without opinion, 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that the
obligation to produce revenue demonstrates that coaching jobs are not
substantially equal).
179. 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
180. Id. at 1321. Furthermore, as previously noted in my Oregon Law
Review Article The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win
for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports:
[I]t is worth noting that the NCAA’s alleged concerns about the
gender pay gap seem disingenuous in light of various NCAA
members’ longstanding practices of allowing for a wide pay gap
between male and female coaches, even in sports where differences in
revenue generation would not justify such a distinction. A 2001
Chronicle of Higher Education survey on the gender pay gap in
college sports found that the disparity in pay among college athletic
coaches was far greater than the disparity in society overall.
Meanwhile, statistics accumulated by the Department of Education
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some Title IX scholars have argued that Stanley was wrongly
decided,181 the case remains good law in the Ninth Circuit—one of
the federal circuits that is perceived as adopting a more liberal
interpretation to Civil Rights statutes such as Title IX.
E. Potential NCAA Advocacy Before Congress for a Statutory
Antitrust Exemption
Finally, the recent ruling in O’Bannon is likely to increase
the NCAA’s efforts to lobby Congress for a statutory exemption
from federal antitrust law.182 As has previously been noted in
various academic writings, “[t]he unique nature of the NCAA as a
bottom-up organization composed of politically powerful
universities makes it into a prime candidate to seek special
from 2003 to 2010 show that the average salary for NCAA Division I
men’s team coaches increased sixty-seven percent, whereas the salary
for women’s team coaches increased just sixteen percent. In the
context of the gender disparity of college coaches’ pay, the NCAA has
remained largely silent.
Edelman, supra note 13, at 1052–53.
181. See, e.g., Erin Buzuvis, More Thoughts on the Title IX Question, TITLE
IX BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014), http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2014/03/more-thoughts-ontitle-ix-question-in.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
182. See Eben Novy-Williams & Erik Matuszewski, NCAA Escape from
Court Loss Seen Resting in Antitrust Exemption, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 11, 2014
12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-11/ncaa-escape-from-courtloss-seen-resting-in-antitrust-exemption.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014)
(discussing the possibility of NCAA members lobbying Congress for a special
statutory antitrust exemption) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review);
Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal
Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally
Restrains Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 659 (2009) (explaining that
independent businesses may concertedly petition Congress to change the law
without risking an antitrust violation based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
which allows competing businesses to join together for the purposes of
influencing government action, even if the underlying goal is one that is to
restrain competition); Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 240 (referencing a 2007
monograph produced by the American Bar Association, which notes that there
are more than twenty statutory exemptions from federal antitrust law). These
exemptions generally fall into three broad categories: “(1) natural monopoly,
(2) market and institutional failures of various kinds, or (3) subsidy for some
socially desired activity or wealth transfer to some socially preferred group.” Id.
at 241.
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legislation in its favor.”183 Moreover, Congress has a history of
passing special legislation to protect the NCAA’s interests to the
detriment of college athletes.184 For example, on September 9,
2004, Congress passed the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust
Act (SPARTA),185 which indoctrinated into law aspects of the
NCAA bylaws that prevented sports agents from providing
anything of value to student athletes.186
Lobbying efforts for an NCAA antitrust exemption might
seek either a broad based exemption (seeking complete insulation
from any collective agreements ranging in topic from television
broadcast rights to coaches’ compensation) or a narrow exemption
(addressing only a specific aspect of NCAA business, such as
athlete pay).187 Among the more recent proposals for granting
183. Edelman, supra note 33, at 418; see also Lazaroff, supra note 13, at
237–38 (discussing various past suggestions for crafting an antitrust exemption
to protect the NCAA).
184. See, e.g., infra note 185 and accompanying text (providing an example
of legislation that protects NCAA interests and harms student-athletes).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 7802(a)(1)(B) (2012).
186. Id.; see also Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of the UAAA
and SPARTA: How America Should Reform Its Sports Agent Laws to Conform
with True Agency Principles, 4 J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 178 (2013) (discussing
remedies under SPARTA).
In terms of remedies, SPARTA provided a cause of action to just
about every party other than the athletes. SPARTA granted the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) authority to enforce the act as if it
were part and parcel to the FTC Act. In addition, it permitted state
attorney general[s] to bring suit against sports agents under the act,
either in the same capacity as the FTC, or on behalf of its residents if
the attorney general could show that the agent had threatened or
adversely affected a resident’s interest. Meanwhile, SPARTA even
allowed NCAA member schools to sue sports agents under the act if
they could show that a sports agent’s conduct resulted in expenses to
the NCAA including ‘losses resulting from penalties, disqualification,
suspension and/or restitution for losses suffered due to self-imposed
compliance actions.’
Id. (citation omitted).
187. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 239 (explaining that “[a] broadly drafted
antitrust exemption for the NCAA could undoubtedly shield it and its members
from any real threat of Sherman Act liability”). In contrast, “a more limited
exemption would provide some relief from the steady stream of litigation, which
creates expense and uncertainty about the validity of NCAA business practices.”
Id. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221–22 (1940)
(noting that Congress does not provide the Court with discretion to preserve
certain price-fixing restraints on social policy grounds, and thus if an industry
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NCAA member schools a narrow exemption, Marquette Law
School professor Matthew Mitten and Pennsylvania State Law
School professor Stephen F. Ross suggested, in a 2014 Oregon
Law Review Article, that Congress should grant an antitrust
exemption to any college that is willing to submit voluntarily to
the authority of “an independent federal regulatory commission,
which would provide an inclusive and transparent rule-making
process.”188
Nevertheless, even if Congress were able to exempt the
NCAA from antitrust law, it would be misguided for Congress to
do so.189 Insulating the NCAA, even in part, from antitrust law
would “chill individual NCAA members’ ability to make
independent decisions from the NCAA majority and thus would
prevent gradual reform movements within the institution.”190 It
further may “slow (if not freeze) the process of individual member
schools implementing stipends to improve the standard of living
for student-athletes.”191
seeks special exemption from antitrust law, it needs to seek congressional
action).
188. See Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better
Promote the Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate
Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 837, 844 (2014) (“Although the commission’s rules
would not be legal mandates, their voluntary adoption by the NCAA and its
member institutions would immunize anticompetitive restraints in connection
with big-time college sports from judicial scrutiny under federal and state
antitrust laws.”).
189. See infra notes 190–93 and accompanying text (discussing the problems
with an NCAA exemption from antitrust law); see also Lazaroff, supra note 13,
at 239–45 (discussing potential rationales behind an antitrust exemption for the
NCAA).
The $64,000 question is reduced to this: does any acceptable rationale
for a legislative antitrust exemption really further the case for giving
one to the NCAA? I think not. . . . The NCAA is the dominant player
in intercollegiate athletics, possessing great bargaining power in
purchasing the raw ingredients for and selling its athletic product.
Id. at 245; see also Edelman, supra note 33, at 418 (concluding that “[e]ven
though Congress has the power to pass a statute that safeguards the
NCAA ‘death penalty,’ it would be misguided for Congress to do so”).
190. Edelman, supra note 33, at 418.
191. Id.; see also Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 246 (“In sum, any blanket
[antitrust] exemption for the NCAA would allow colleges and universities to
keep money that a competitive market would put in the pockets of others. One
might call the result a ‘reverse Robin Hood effect,’ where the rich get richer and
the have-nots continue to struggle.”).
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Finally, an administrative solution to regulate college sports
such as the one suggested by Professors Ross and Mitten still
ignores the overwhelming political power that the NCAA already
exercises over the U.S. government.192 It further ignores the
general view that consumers are best protected from
anticompetitive conduct by free market solutions rather than
bureaucratic remedies.193
Even Professors Ross and Mitten seem to recognize the
implicit drawbacks to using administrative solutions to regulate
sports leagues rather than antitrust law. Professor Mitten writes
in his 2000 law review article, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA
Regulation of ‘Big Time’ College Athletics, that the commercial
business practices of the NCAA ideally should be held subject to
antitrust law because “[t]here is no valid justification for
permitting the NCAA to determine arbitrarily the permissible
degree of economic competition among its members.”194
Meanwhile, Professor Ross concludes in his seminal 1989 article
Monopoly Sports Leagues that it would be better to break up
Major League Baseball and the National Football League than to
allow for administrative regulation of these leagues because
“those officials assigned to regulate the sports industry soon may
192. See Mitten & Ross, supra note 188, at 844 (discussing an
administrative law proposal to regulate college sports); see also Greg Johnson,
Lawmaker Challenges NCAA on Tax Exemption, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2006),
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/oct/06/sports/sp-ncaa6 (last visited Nov. 18,
2014) (quoting professor Gary Roberts, one of the leading authorities on sports
law in the United States, as describing the political power of the NCAA and
college sports as “unbelievable”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
193. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 247–48 (comparing a blanket antitrust
exemption for the NCAA to “leaving the fox free to devour its prey”); Edelman,
supra note 33, at 402–19 (discussing the importance of treating the NCAA
identically to other business associations with market power). See Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 252 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
“[t]he basic premise underlying the Sherman Act is the assumption that free
competition among business entities will produce the best price levels,” and that
“[c]ollusion among competitors, it is believed, may produce prices that harm
consumers”); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (concluding
that “the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources”).
194. Matthew Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulations of ‘Big
Time’ College Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century
Ideals of Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 1, 8 (2000).
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become ‘captured’ by the very owners that they supposedly are
regulating.”195
VII. Conclusion
The district court’s recent ruling in O’Bannon v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association was, at once, both pioneering and
mundane. The decision was pioneering to the extent that it was
among the first to recognize that certain restraints on collegeathlete pay may violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.196 In
addition, the ruling established both a limited free market for
college athletes’ services197 and important legal precedent to
facilitate future antitrust challenges to other aspects of the
NCAA’s bylaws.198
Nevertheless, the O’Bannon ruling was also mundane
because it failed to establish a true free market for college-athlete
services, and it failed to grant college athletes with legal
protection to license the rights to their names, images, and
likenesses to third parties.199 Although the court in O’Bannon had
the opportunity to fully enjoin the NCAA’s restraints on studentathlete pay, it instead elected to only enjoin those aspects of the
NCAA rules that prevent colleges from providing athletes with
the full cost of attendance to a school plus up to $5,000 per year
via trust fund.200 While some legal scholars describe this
injunction as helping to “split the baby,” antitrust jurisprudence
is not supposed to be about creating compromises donned in
social policy.201 It is supposed to protect consumers and free
markets.
195. Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 702–
03, 755 (1989) (noting that “[b]aseball and football are not natural monopolies;
two or more rival leagues can compete in each sport,” and “[t]he existence of
rival leagues would solve most of these economic problems [associated with
professional sports]”).
196. Supra Part III.
197. Supra Part III.
198. Supra Part IV.
199. Supra Part V.
200. Supra Part III.
201. Ken Belson, What the O’Bannon Ruling Means for Colleges and Players,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/ sports/what-the-
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Consequently, the O’Bannon decision—albeit an important
step in the quest for improving college athletes’ economic rights—
will likely not serve as the last word in determining the legal
status of concerted restraints on college-athlete pay. Subsequent
lawsuits are likely to attempt to use the favorable language in
O’Bannon to further carve away at the NCAA’s limits on free
market compensation for college athletes.202 Meanwhile, NCAA
leaders are likely to attempt to overturn the O’Bannon decision
through either a successful appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit or a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court.203 At the same time, the NCAA may lobby Congress for an
antitrust exemption to limit the viability of future athlete
lawsuits against the NCAA.204
At the end of the day, Judge Wilken’s decision in O’Bannon v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association will likely be
memorialized as the decision that resurrected the legal argument
that the NCAA “no pay” rules may violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Even though the O’Bannon case failed to establish
a true free market for college athletes’ services, it created a
blueprint for future lawyers to attempt to use antitrust law to
obtain that very result.

obannon-ruling-means-for-colleges-and-players.html?_r=0 (last visited Nov. 18,
2014) (quoting New York University Professor of Sports Management Robert
Boland) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
202. Supra Part IV.
203. Supra Part VI.A.
204. Supra Part VI.E.

